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Sex and sexuality: an evolutionary view 
John Launer, M. D. 
 
The aim of this paper is to present an evolutionary view of human sex and sexuality, 
and to suggest how this might enrich psychoanalysis. Firstly, I offer a summary of 
Darwin’s main ideas, including those relating to sex, and examine how these have 
been developed by more recent evolutionary scholars. I then give an account of the 
divergence between psychoanalysis and classical Darwinian thought, and describe 
how one of the early psychoanalysts, Sabina Spielrein, touched upon themes that have 
resonances in modern evolutionary thought. Following a review of some 
contemporary attempts to bring psychoanalysis and evolutionary thought into 
harmony with each other, I make some suggestions regarding a view of sex and 
sexuality that might be helpful in psychoanalytic terms while being sound in 
evolutionary ones. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
‘I begin with the fundamental principle of evolutionary biology, that all living 
organisms have evolved to seek and use resources to enhance their 
reproductive success. They strive for matings, invest in children or help other 
genetic relatives, and build genetically profitable relationships. In biology, this 
is not a controversial proposition, and it follows that organisms will act as 
though they are able to calculate costs and benefits. Furthermore the 
currencies are, in the end, reproductive: that is, who survives and who 
reproduces best? This principle seems so simple that it is hard to imagine that 
diverse and complicated behaviors could arise from it. Yet they do, because 
the ecological conditions that shape success vary so widely.’ From Low, Why 
Sex Matters: A Darwinian Look at Human Behavior [2000, p. xiii.]   
 
Why should psychoanalysts, and others using psychodynamic ideas clinically, 
need an evolutionary understanding of sex and sexuality? There is certainly a case to 
be made that psychoanalysis has become a hermeneutic art that is now far distant 
from biological science, with practitioners looking for meaning through reference to 
their own interactions with patients, rather than according to any fixed external 
framework. In spite of this, psychoanalysis has never been an atheoretical field, nor 
has theory remained static. Trainees in several professions learn a complex body of 
theory derived from Freud and his successors, in order to make sense of how their 
patients’ minds work and of what happens in the consulting room. Harmonization 
with mainstream scientific ideas is already happening in relation to areas like 
neuroscience, cognitive psychology and evidence-based practice. There seems no 
reason why it should not happen in relation to evolution and sex as well. As I hope to 
show, much psychoanalytic thinking, although not all, could fit well within a modern 
evolutionary framework.  
 
DARWIN AND THE MODERN EVOLUTIONARY SYNTHESIS 
 
Darwin’s ideas, like Einstein’s, are among the three or four interconnected 
systems of thought which underlie the contemporary scientific understanding of 
reality (Deutsch, 1997). His theory has remained robust enough to fit everything that 
is currently known within his scientific field. However, while few non-physicists 
would claim to have a good working understanding of Einstein’s theories, it is 
common for people to believe they have a good grasp of Darwin and evolutionary 
theory even when their understanding is only partial or distorted. This may be as 
common in the psychoanalytic world as anywhere else. To take the most obvious 
example, contrary to popular belief Darwin did not invent the phrase ‘survival of the 
fittest’ and rarely used it. When he did so, he was referring to how an organism 
‘fitted’ its environment – not to ‘fitness’ in the modern everyday sense of muscular 
strength or athletic prowess. His view is more accurately expressed as ‘preservation of 
the favored’.  
 
Similarly, Darwin was not the first person to propose that every species including 
human beings must be descended from a preceding one rather than being created ‘de 
novo’. Other scientists had already done so. Darwin’s unique contribution was to 
work out the link between descent and the challenges of a changing environment 
(Darwin, 1859). This lay in the selective survival of whichever variations happened to 
be suited to changing circumstances: hence the survival of ‘what fitted’. Darwin’s use 
of the term adaptation did not refer to what happens during a single lifetime – 
although clearly adaptation in the colloquial sense does occur there – but to what 
results from selection over many generations. For Darwin, an adaptation was a 
variation that had proliferated because it had contributed to long term survival and 
reproduction. He argued that one could never predict which individuals or species 
would survive, but one could be certain that random variation would take place in a 
species and this would lead over long periods of time to non-random selection – or in 
some circumstances to extinction. 
 As Darwin progressed in his thinking, he came to place an increasing emphasis on 
the way that competition for mates, and choice among different mates, played an 
important part in evolution – so called sexual selection (Darwin, 1871). He also 
became interested in how animals behaved, as well as in their physical characteristics. 
He proposed that, just as certain anatomical features would give an individual or 
species an increased chance of prevailing, so might a particular pattern of activity, 
including such sex-related activities as competition between males, and courtship 
between males and females. He traced much human emotional expression to its 
evolutionary roots, for example pointing out how the facial changes brought about 
during sneering reproduce the way that all carnivorous mammals expose their canine 
teeth to deter rivals (Darwin, 1872). In a famous statement, he anticipated the day 
when ‘psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary 
acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation’ (Darwin, 1859, p. 222).  
 
Darwin’s key ideas of variation, competition, adaptation, and natural and sexual 
selection have stood the test of time remarkably well, although his ideas have become 
subject to some modification as well as a vast amount of elaboration. This mainly 
took place in the second half of the twentieth century, in what is sometimes described 
as the post-Darwinian synthesis, or neo-Darwinism. Much of this has focused on 
genes as the unit of survival and reproduction (Williams, 1966). In this respect, genes 
are commonly termed ‘selfish’, although this term can lead to as much confusion as 
the term ‘fitness’ (Dawkins, 1976). Genes are not selfish in the sense of deciding how 
to behave, or by operating through competition alone. They simply do what they do, 
which is to replicate. Genes also have to co-operate in order to form cells and 
organisms. Organisms in their turn have to co-operate in order to promote collective 
interests (Nesse, 2006). In many species including humans, co-operation both 
between the two sexes and among individuals of the same sex is crucial for raising 
offspring and for social functioning generally (Hamilton 1996, 2002; Trivers, 2002). 
Selection can therefore be understood as a process that involves a number different of 
levels from the gene and the cell, to the individual, couple, family, group, and the 
community: this is sometimes described as multi-level selection (Wilson and Sober, 
1994). Selection also shapes very many mechanisms that allow organisms to adapt 
their behavior according to their circumstances, with a remarkable degree of 
plasticity. 
 
One idea that can help to make sense of much evolutionary theory is the 
distinction between ultimate or distal purposes, and proximate ones (Tinbergen, 1963; 
Mayr, 1988). These are not entirely watertight categories, but they are a helpful 
heuristic for understanding evolutionary explanations. Distal explanations always 
seek to answer the question: how has this feature or behavior contributed to this type 
of organism prevailing in the long run rather than becoming extinct? Proximate 
purposes and the explanations that go with them, by contrast, relate to the 
mechanisms that help organisms achieve this objective. The best known example of 
this in mammals is probably the attachment system, which patterns mother-infant 
interaction, and contributes to long term survival and hence reproduction (Ainsworth, 
1967; Bowlby, 1969.) Explanations of such proximate processes examine them as 
strategies, and look at the tradeoffs they involve – for example, a mother staying close 
to her infant is less able to forage, and if she breast-feeds as opposed to weaning she is 
less likely to become pregnant (Stearns, 1989). These strategies, and the tradeoffs that 
go with them, appear to have a genetic substrate and also plasticity in response to 
environmental pressures and demands. 
 
Probably the central concept within the modern evolutionary synthesis is that of 
reproductive fitness (Hamilton, 1964; Maynard Smith, 1989). Reproductive fitness is 
not an intrinsic state, but a retrospective judgment based on the number of progeny at 
a given time afterwards. It is therefore neither a moral or social judgment but an 
arithmetical and teleological one, helping us to make sense of how we got to be the 
way we are rather than some other way. The related term, inclusive fitness recognizes 
indirect contributions from near kin as well. Those of us who are now alive are by 
definition the descendants of those who were reproductively fit, as well as being the 
beneficiaries of those who assisted them socially. Our ancestors form a long and 
unbroken line of individuals who prevailed in each generation because of physical and 
behavioral characteristics, sexual choices and communal interactions that led to 
reproductive success. They extracted sufficient resources from the environment to 
survive and reproduce, through both competition and collaboration with others (Low, 
2001). 
 
Any attempt to align psychoanalytic thinking with evolutionary ideas must 
address potential allegations of genetic or biological determinism. In spite of the 
misconceptions held by some practitioners of talking therapies, explanations of 
human behavior based on our genetic or biological inheritance do not deprive people 
of the opportunity to make choices, nor do they exclude looking for complementary 
explanations at other levels of context including infancy, family relationships or 
society. Nor do the vast majority of modern evolutionary scholars subscribe to the 
kinds of beliefs that have sometimes brought evolutionary thinking into disrepute. In a 
book entitled Sense and Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior, 
Laland and Brown (2011) point out the following:  
 
Using evolutionary theory is not the same as taking a genetic determinist 
viewpoint. Genetic determinism is the belief that our genes contain blueprints 
for our behavior that will always be followed and that constitute our destiny. 
Such a belief would run contrary to much that is known about how human 
behavior develops. Where researchers talk about genetic influences on human 
behavior, they do not mean that the behavior is completely determined by 
genetic effects, that no other factors play a part in our development, or that a 
single gene is responsible for each behavior. Although most evolutionary 
biologists focus exclusively on genetic inheritance, it does not follow that 
genes are the sole determinant of human behavior, and the vast majority take 
it for granted that multiple environmental influences will play a part 
throughout development. [p. 11] 
 
Like any other accounts of how we feel and behave the way we do, evolutionary 
explanations add an extra dimension to our understanding of ourselves. While poor 
evolutionary explanations may fit the category of ‘Just-So Stories’, good evolutionary 
ones can be turned into hypotheses that can be tested against observable phenomena 
in biology, psychology and culture (Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Stearns, 
Allal and Mace, 2007; Muehlenbein and Flinn, 2011; Flinn, 2012). The world of 
evolutionary scholarship is no more monolithic than the psychoanalytic one, with 
different writers taking a variety of positions in relation to such things as the co-
evolution of genes and culture, or the plasticity of human learning (Bolhuis et al, 
2011).  At the same time, all would subscribe to the view expressed by the literary 
scholar Brian Boyd (2009): ‘Some of the answers proposed in an evolutionary 
explanation of human nature may be premature, but they will be tested, sifted, and 
refined in due course. But incorporating deep time into our knowledge of the species 
adds a dimension whose absence had distorted all our thinking.’ (p. 41)  
  
EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOANALYSIS: GOING THEIR SEPARATE WAYS 
The relationship between Freud and evolutionary theory is complex (Hartmann 
1958; Ritvo, 1974; Sulloway, 1979), and there is not enough space here to analyze 
this in detail. However it would be reasonable to characterize Freud in the earlier 
years of his career as a neuroscientist who worked within mainstream biology and 
under the immediate and recent influence of Darwin. He did so in an era and within 
an academic environment that had taken on the Darwinian project with passion, so 
that many of the great biologists of the generation that followed Darwin came from 
the German-speaking world (Magner, 1994). These included August Weismann who 
discovered the difference between the sex cells that determined inheritance and the 
somatic cells that did not. They also included Oskar Hertwig who first described how 
a sperm penetrates an egg, Friedrich Miescher who identified the substance he called 
nuclein and we now call DNA, as well as sexologists like Krafft-Ebing who tried, 
with very limited success, to relate human sexual psychology to biological and 
evolutionary theory (Krafft-Ebing, 1886).  
Nevertheless, it seems that by mid-career Freud saw his metapsychological project 
as something entirely independent from the science of biology. While remaining 
committed in general terms to the idea that mental functions must have emerged 
through evolution, some of his thinking diverged from classical evolutionary ideas. 
This was true particularly in relation to his belief that acquired characteristics, 
including those that resulted from traumatic experiences in childhood, could be passed 
on genetically – the so-called Lamarckian fallacy. Whereas Weismann had, in 
biological terms, conclusively knocked this fallacy on the head, Freud was happy to 
claim (E. Freud, 1960): ‘Lamarck’s theory of evolution coincides with the final 
outcome of psychoanalytic thinking’ (p. 317). It is worth making the point here that 
the modern field of epigenetics, showing how some genes can be switched on or off 
by the environment, has not vindicated Lamarck, since no-one has shown that the 
environment can alter genes themselves, in a way that directly advantages the 
descendants of such individuals (Haig, 2007; Dickins and Rachman, 2012). Freud’s 
ideas on some issues – most specifically the perversions – were shot through with 
another popular fallacy of the time, deriving from the recapitulation theory of Ernst 
Haeckel (1899), namely the notion that pathological states of mind could be 
regressions to earlier evolutionary stages of mammalian and reptilian development. 
Taken overall, there seems no reason to dissent from the view of psychoanalysts 
Kriegman and Slavin (1992) when they write that Freud’s view of the evolutionary 
process was ‘in some ways quite crude and quaint’ (p. 35).  
The divergence of Freud’s ideas from evolutionary thought can perhaps best be 
understood by examining a curious intellectual episode from 1911-12, associated with 
the person of Sabina Spielrein. Spielrein is best known on account of her affair with 
Carl Jung while she was his patient (Carotenuto, 1982; Kerr, 1993; Richbaecher, 
2003; Launer, 2012). Freud played a major if questionable part in helping the two to 
disentangle without scandal, although the episode had a negative effect on his view of 
Jung. Spielrein was also a notable thinker in her own right (Covington and Wharton, 
2003). She anticipated ideas about child development that were later associated with 
Melanie Klein and Anna Freud. She worked alongside Jean Piaget, and later played a 
major role in introducing psychoanalysis in Russia (Ovcharenko, 1999).  
In the early stage of her career Spielrein delivered a paper on sex and death to the 
Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, later published in the Society’s Jahrbuch with the 
title ‘Destruction as the Cause of Coming into Being’ (Spielrein, 1912). The paper is a 
peculiar mixture of early Freudian psychology, Jungian mysticism and philosophical 
speculation, but it also has a distinct and consistent evolutionary theme to it. This 
theme also runs through Spielrein’s diaries and correspondence. In the opening 
sections of the paper she appears to be making an explicit claim for a theory of sex 
that bridges psychoanalysis and evolution. Starting from an examination of why sex is 
accompanied by ambivalent feelings, she writes as follows: 
During reproduction, a union of female and male cells occurs. The unity of 
each cell thus is destroyed and, from the product of this destruction, new life 
originates. Following production of a new generation, many lower creatures 
e.g. the mayfly, forfeit their lives, dying off. Creation for this organism is 
undertaken for survival and is simultaneously destructive to the adult. The 
individual must strongly hunger for this new creation in order to place its own 
destruction in creation’s service.  
 
The fusion of germ cells during copulation mimics the correspondingly 
intimate union of two individuals: a union in which one forces its way into the 
other.... The male component merges with the female component that becomes 
reorganized and assumes a new form mediated by the unfamiliar intruder…It 
would be highly unlikely if the individual did not at least surmise, through 
corresponding feelings, these internal deconstructive-reconstructive events 
[pp. 156-7]. 
 
It is this passage that gave Freud the idea of the death instinct – although by his 
own admission he did not fully understand Spielrein’s version of it, and he appears to 
have used similar language to describe something quite different (Freud, 1920, p. 55 
n. 1). Spielrein never actually used the term death instinct in her paper, and it is clear 
that the apprehension of death that she described there is a biological one, and a 
component of the reproductive instinct. According to her argument, the reproductive 
drive is so powerful that it overrides absolutely everything else, even the drive to 
survive as an individual. This is amplified later in the same paper when she asks:  
 
Do we not possess powerful drives that set our psychic contents in motion, 
untroubled by the welfare and misery of the ego?... I must dogmatically 
defend the viewpoint that the personal psyche is governed by unconscious 
impulses that lie deeper and, in their demands, are unconcerned with our 
feeling reactions. Pleasure is merely the affirmative reaction of the ego to 
these demands flowing from the depths [pp. 159-160]. 
 
Similarly, in a letter to Jung some years later, she wrote about the way children 
seek attachment in the interests of their survival and hence, ultimately, of 
reproduction (Carotenuto, 1982): ‘Tranquility, freedom of movement, play with other 
children, favorite foods – everything is sacrificed in return for more attention from 
those whose love one desires. To express my personal opinion, I would include the 
instinct for self-preservation in the instinct for preservation of the species’ (p. 52). 
 
Whatever limitations there were in Spielrein’s arguments (Britton, 2003), it seems 
as if she was proposing a view of sex, emotions and the mind in terms of a single 
instinct, namely the reproductive one. Although her 1912 paper fell far short of being 
a coherent manifesto for an evolutionary understanding of sexual psychology, she did 
nevertheless touch there and elsewhere upon several themes that now preoccupy 
evolutionists. These include the imperative drive for reproduction, the importance of 
conflict between the sexes in this process, the proximal role of pleasure, the purpose 
of attachment, and the reciprocal relationship between sex and death. Paradoxically, it 
was her experiences as a vulnerable young woman, embroiled in a dangerous affair 
with her psychiatrist, which attuned her to these issues.  
 
Freud and Jung’s reaction to Spielrein’s way of thinking was unfavorable, not just 
for personal reasons but for theoretical ones as well. ‘What troubles me most’, Freud 
wrote, is that Fräulein Spielrein wants to subordinate the psychological material to 
biological considerations; this dependency is no more acceptable than a dependency 
on philosophy, physiology or brain anatomy’ (McGuire, 1974, p. 469). Jung agreed: ‘I 
know, of course, that Spielrein operates too much with biology’, he replied. ‘But she 
didn’t learn that from me, it is home-grown’ (p.  470).  
 
Freud’s view about ‘subordination’ to biology at this stage in his career was more 
than a whim. It was a calculated intellectual and political act, and was seen as such. 
Indeed, on the day before Spielrein’s lecture, Eugen Bleuler – the leading biological 
psychiatrist of his time – had resigned from the International Psychoanalytic 
Association on the grounds that psychoanalysis had become a religious cult instead of 
a science (Alexander and Selesnick, 1965, p. 5; McGuire, 1977, p. 468). Bleuler was 
director of the hospital where Jung attended Spielrein, and may have been more 
instrumental in her treatment than Jung (Graf-Nold, 2003). It was Bleuler who 
encouraged her to study psychiatry, assisted her entry into medical school, and later 
became her supervisor. His resignation from the psychoanalytic movement, followed 
by his pupil’s failure to make any impact, furthered a parting of the ways between 
psychoanalysis and mainstream biological thought.  
 
 
BUILDING BRIDGES 
 
Although psychoanalysis and evolutionary studies have gone their separate ways 
in the century since Spielrein gave her lecture, there have also been attempts to build 
bridges. A number of scholars have put forward arguments that the distance between 
certain core ideas of psychoanalysis and evolution is not as great as they might 
appear. These include an evolutionary account of the Oedipus complex by Badcock 
(1990); the writings of evolutionary psychiatrist Randolph Nesse on psychodynamic 
mechanisms including the ego defenses (Nesse, 1990; Nesse and Lloyd, 1992); and 
the work of the philosopher Jim Hopkins on conscience and conflict (2003). All of 
these are attempts to link the phenomena that analysts discover inductively in the 
consulting room with the deductive premises of evolutionary theory. Another, far 
larger group of studies are related to the fields of attachment, mentalisation, and 
neuropsychoanalysis. These are essentially studies of proximate evolutionary 
mechanisms, undertaken by psychoanalysts who acknowledge the need to restore 
connections with empirical science and, in particular, to relate mental phenomena to 
the biological imperative of infant survival (see for example Stern, 1985; Fonagy, 
2001; Fonagy et al, 2002; Solms and Turnbull, 2002; Solms and Panksepp, 2012).  
 
A number of pioneers in the past twenty years have taken a more fundamental 
approach. Rather than looking for points of convergence or important linkages 
between evolution and psychoanalysis, they have argued that it may be necessary to 
construct an entirely new paradigm: one that takes the central concepts of neo-
Darwinian theory as a starting point and examines what holds up in psychoanalytic 
theory by comparison, and what needs rejection or modification. In 2000, a group of 
sixteen such writers published a collection of essays entitled Genes on the Couch 
(Gilbert and Bailey, 2000). Much of their work is based on ideas from the 
evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (Barkow, Cosmides, and 
Tooby, 1992), and from Randolph Nesse (Nesse and Williams, 1995).  
 
In their introduction, the editors of Genes on the Couch write of the psychological 
importance of rivalry between members of the same sex, and with the opposite sex. 
They recognize that our evolved strategies for survival and reproduction do not all 
necessarily follow the same pattern, and their aims may not always be compatible. 
They identify the function of all painful mental states as being to alert us to dangers, 
threats and losses. They argue that an objective of talking therapies should be to help 
people to understand the evolutionary nature of such states and why the distress 
caused by them can be so intense. The most striking contribution in the book comes 
from US psychoanalyst Daniel Kriegman. In a compelling metaphor he talks of the 
need to rediscover the evolutionary baby in the bathwater of psychoanalysis 
(Kriegman, 2000). ‘Before we empty the enormous quantity of dirty bathwater’, he 
writes, ‘wouldn’t we be wise to make a search to see if there is a baby in it? Not only 
would I suggest that we will find a living baby, I would also suggest that the baby has 
nearly drowned and is in desperate need of evolutionary biological resuscitation’ (p. 
71).  
 
The most ambitious attempt at such resuscitation was in fact written some years 
earlier by Kriegman himself, along with his fellow psychoanalyst Malcolm Slavin 
(1992). In The Adaptive Psyche, they argue that Freud’s ‘flawed yet appropriate 
efforts to deal within an adaptive context is the task that requires further exploration 
in the light of contemporary evolutionary theory’ (p. 54). Slavin and Kriegman talk of 
the long, dismal history of attempts to distance human psychology from the rest of 
nature. They suggest that the emphasis on culture (or language, morality, religion, 
and so on) is a defensive way of separating humans from the rest of the animal world. 
They argue that a return to evolutionary thinking is essential to prevent 
psychoanalysis losing all point of reference in the real world, while still allowing it to 
retain its capacity to seek new meaning: 
 
We believe that the evolutionary biological perspective … enables us to 
navigate between the methodological Scylla of hermeneutics and 
constructivism that is only partially aware of its own basic assumptions about 
what is universal in the human condition, and the Charybdis of a ritualistic 
scientism that is as likely biased by its own assumptions about the human 
condition while naively assuming that its methods – suited to the study of 
inanimate particles and forces – will generate an ‘objective picture of the 
psyche.’ [p.  276.] 
 
Drawing on the work of modern evolutionary theorists, they speak of the ample 
evidence that now exists that organisms, throughout nature, are adept at detecting kin 
and degrees of kinship, thus emphasizing our intuitive drive to replicate our own 
genes.  In examining the relationship between parents and their offspring, they assert 
that conflict between parents and children is not just a matter of the children’s crude, 
untutored biology resisting the parents’ attempts to socialize them. Drawing on the 
genetic theory of parent-infant conflict first proposed by Trivers (1974), they argue 
that this can be viewed as a biological conflict between differing needs of the two 
generations. They point out that the design of the child psyche has been fashioned by 
hundreds of thousands of generations of such conflicts and the compromises they 
entail. On virtually every psychological issue in the course of human development, 
they argue, an evolutionarily successful way of being a parent entails a divided 
strategy: to treat any child both as an ally but also as a competitor.  
 
Very much of the case laid out by Slavin and Kriegman depends on this idea of 
the conflict between one generation and the next. We are driven to replicate, but the 
children we have succeed in conceiving do not solely represent our own interests. ‘A 
self designed for the human relational world must be prepared to engage in an 
extraordinarily complex set of developmental strategies that serve, in part, to defend 
against having one’s interest usurped by others’ (p. 143). Interestingly, they focus 
almost entirely on the relationship between the generations and have relatively little 
to say about gender relations. This is a puzzling gap in their work. In the words of 
Richard Dawkins (1976): ‘If there is conflict of interests between parents and 
children, who share fifty per cent of each other’s genes, how much more severe must 
be the conflict between mates, who are not related to each other?’ (p. 140). It would 
be a small step to apply ideas about the tensions between parent and child to those 
between parent and parent – and indeed, to return to where Freud originally started, 
namely with sex.  
 
SEX, EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 
 
Drawing together some of the themes above, I now want to propose a view of sex 
and sexuality that is sound in evolutionary terms and I hope might also be useful in 
psychoanalytic ones. The propositions that follow are in no way a comprehensive 
account of sex from an evolutionary point of view. They are meant as pointers, or 
invitations, for any practitioners who think it might be reasonable to take an 
evolutionary view of sex into the talking therapies, and who would like to consider 
how this could enrich psychoanalytic understanding. 
 
1. Sex is about reproduction. Sex is central to human life, as indeed it is to all 
sexually reproductive species. There is not a single evolutionist who would disagree 
with Freud in placing sex at the centre of human psychology. What seems peculiar is 
that Freud moved the focus of his thinking from sex as a reproductive activity to sex 
as a source of pleasure. The subsequent displacement of sex from the psychoanalytic 
agenda in many places is even more puzzling. As Spielrein argued, the overriding 
imperative in life is for reproduction. The direct and intense pleasure of sex has 
evolved precisely so we will replicate. In the words of evolutionary anthropologist 
James Chisholm (1999), ‘People, like all organisms, are not evolved to maximize 
health, wealth, happiness, life span, vigor, power, prestige, beauty, love, sex, truth, 
honor, reason or anything else, but to have descendants, which is continuation’ (p. 
205).  
 
2. Sex and death are complementary. Sex is necessary because of death. In the 
absence of death, sex would be not only redundant but also undesirable, since it would 
lead to rapid depletion of resources by an ever-increasing population. Genes for 
ageing and cell death appear to have evolved at around the same time as sexual 
reproduction (Clark, 1996), and embody this reciprocal relationship. Sex allows new 
variations to emerge, and – presumably for that reason – selection has favored genes 
that help us to reproduce, not to survive (Williams, 1957; Ridley, 1993). In 
evolutionary terms the idea of a death instinct, as such, makes no sense. There may be 
many evolutionary explanations for why human beings may at times feel, and behave, 
destructively or self-destructively, but that is another matter. Death is a given, to 
which the reproductive instinct is the only possible response, if we wish to avoid 
genetic extinction.  
 
3. Reproduction involves more than sex. There are lively debates among 
evolutionists concerning how many aspects of human life are directed towards 
reproduction and how many are simply incidental consequences (see for example 
Gould and Lewontin, 1979; Hagen, 2005). However, there is a consensus that the 
structures and functions of all living creatures, including humans, have been selected 
for their adaptedness for reproduction, and remain directed towards it. Both the 
conscious and unconscious mind must be organized around the pursuit of 
reproductive fitness, to achieve genetic continuation in the face of death. The most 
completely articulated account of this process, from a psychological perspective, is by 
Chisholm (1999). He proposes that survival, growth and development, together with 
maturation and learning, all serve the purposes of reproduction. His view 
encompasses emotional life as well. Drawing on neuro-scientific understanding (Le 
Doux, 1996; Damasio, 1994), he argues that our emotions are our best way – indeed 
our only way – of assessing our interactions with others and with the environment, 
and how far these are progressing our direct and indirect reproductive interests. Hence 
desire, affection, anxiety, envy and rage may each signal perceptions of opportunity 
or threat, and lead to concomitant action. By extension (although Chisholm does not 
propose this), fantasies could be seen as reproductive calculations, exploring the 
tradeoffs that need to be made between sex and survival, the level of commitment to 
partners and offspring, and so on. This overarching view of human endeavor, within a 
single purposive framework, in some ways echoes Freud, but substituting 
reproductive work for libido.  
 
4. Reproduction involves both conflict and collaboration: Some evolutionary 
writers like Peterson and Wrangham (1996) have placed an emphasis on conflict and 
warfare as a selective force, including the murder of male rivals and the rape and 
abduction of females. More recently, scholars like Hrdy (2009), Nowak (2011) and 
Boehm (2012) have promoted the idea that collaboration is the main driver for 
selection, including shared parenting, and child care by wider kin. A measured 
evolutionary view probably sides with neither Hobbes nor Rousseau but sees all 
reproductive endeavors including sex itself as dependent upon maintaining a careful 
balance between conflict and collaboration (Hopkins, 2003; Seabright, 2012). The 
psyche is constrained and defined by the necessity of pursuing selfish ends by selfless 
means. In the same way, cultural and legal norms, faith communities and educational 
traditions can be understood as collective compromises in pursuit of inclusive fitness. 
Each of these may of course break down at times when external pressures become 
intolerable or are perceived as such. 
  
5. The two sexes have different interests from each other. Sex involves 
considerable risk for females. There are the dangers of pregnancy, followed by the 
prolonged demands of child-rearing. To compound matters, eggs are far more 
precious than sperm from an arithmetical point of view. A woman carries only a few 
hundred viable eggs at puberty, which must last her entire reproductive lifetime. By 
contrast, men will manufacture sperm by the billions, and sexual intercourse requires 
less investment or risk for them. There is evidence of a tension between these 
different interests at many biological levels. After intercourse, an overwhelming 
majority of sperm are destroyed in the vagina or cervix (Baker and Bellis, 1995). 
When a pregnancy is established, there is a fifty per cent chance that the woman’s 
womb will reject the resulting combination of her own genes with the ones from the 
sperm as unsuitable. The same tension also appears at a social level. Across cultures, 
the two sexes appear to operate different strategies in keeping with these same 
differences (Buss, 2003). Broadly speaking, males give a higher priority to youth and 
beauty in mating, while women give more priority to status and commitment in their 
partners. Conflicts between the sexes commonly center on these issues, not least in 
the consulting room. Although humans are unique among primates in the involvement 
of fathers in child-rearing, commitment to a relationship and family still represents 
quite different reproductive opportunities and limitations for the two partners 
involved.  
 
6. Conflicts over genetic interests are ubiquitous. Kriegman and Slavin’s thesis 
concerning parent-infant conflict can quite easily be extrapolated to relations between 
the sexes. Parents share virtually none of each others’ genes, outside incestuous 
matings. Almost all of us are the embodied representation of two quite different sets 
of parental or dynastic interests. Divergent genetic interests are reflected at a 
physiological level in the conflicts that take place in the fetus and placenta, where 
genes from the two parents compete to suppress each other, in determining the size of 
the baby and the mother’s blood pressure (Haig, 1993; Reik and Walter, 2001). Some 
parts of the fetal brain, such as the hypothalamus, are coded by the father’s genes, 
while others including the cerebral cortex are maternally derived. Some writers have 
proposed that neurological conflicts between these different parts of the brain may be 
experienced subjectively as emotional conflicts within the fetus and perhaps 
subsequently in infantile life (Badcock, 2000; Haig, 2003; Burt and Trivers, 2008). 
The infant’s aggressive determination to take possession of its mother and defy her to 
have more babies, as described by Melanie Klein (1957), may well represent its 
genetic interests in preventing others sharing her resources (Hopkins, 2003). Family 
conflicts resonate with evolutionary studies of how far close or distant relatives will 
go in support of each other (Hamilton, 1996). The echoes of competing genetic 
interests may resound as parents, step-parents, families and step-families fight for 
their respective positions over the resources that should be invested – sometimes 
literally – in child-rearing, schooling, shopping and other areas (Baker and Oram, 
1998).  
 7. Deceit and self-deception play a significant part in the pursuit of reproductive  
interests. A number of evolutionists have addressed deception and self-deception in 
terms of the essential parts they play in reproductive strategies. Exaggeration and self- 
aggrandizement may be necessary both for intrasexual rivalry and intersexual 
courtship (Buss, 2003). The ability to conceal signals from others is enhanced by the 
ability to convince oneself as well: actors who believe their own performance are 
better than those who do not (Alexander, 1989; Trivers, 2011). Self-deception may be 
equally useful to conceal missteps and betrayals, in the service of preserving 
relationships (Nesse, 1990). Such views in some ways map onto psychoanalytic 
constructions like denial and projection, and supplement these by assigning them a 
central purpose in negotiating over investment in relationships, and hence in genetic 
continuation (Hopkins, 2003). The notion that wishful thinking has a central place in 
human psychology, particularly where sexual aspirations are concerned, is one that    
unites evolutionary and psychoanalytic thinking. 
 
8. Differences in sexual behavior represent different reproductive strategies. 
Young adults have to make continual decisions about the trade-offs between seeking 
to procreate here and now, delaying it until later, or prioritizing investment in existing 
progeny (Chisholm, 1999). Human beings in conditions of relative deprivation, where 
life expectancy is low, commonly pursue sex soon after puberty and have many 
children. In more secure conditions, adults will tend to use contraception, wait longer 
before conceiving, and will invest their resources in a smaller number of children. 
They will also invest in their genes in other ways: through educating their children 
and leaving them large bequests, or by remaining childless and putting their energy 
into their wider family or communities. Simpson and Belsky (2008) and others have 
proposed that different forms of mother-infant attachment behavior also reflect 
different environments, endowing children with emotional and behavioral strategies 
for reproductive success in the circumstances their own parents grew up in. Seen in 
these terms, the compulsion to repeat an apparently negative pattern of feelings and 
behavior might be understood as reasonable in evolutionary terms: an enactment of 
responses learned during an infancy that prepared offspring for an expected world of 
conflict and stress. One could then reframe therapy as an opportunity to test this 
enactment against the more neutral or nurturing environment of the consulting room.    
 
9. Differences in sexuality may also represent different reproductive strategies. 
Sexualities differ – and not only in humans (Zuk, 2003). Some evolutionary 
psychologists believe that preferences like homosexuality are not as ‘non-
reproductive’ as they may seem (Sommers and Vasey, 2006). Many of those 
practicing gay or lesbian sex may have children through heterosexual encounters in 
the course of their lives, while some scholars have argued that bisexuality may confer 
advantages in terms of the signals it offers to the opposite sex (Buss, 2003), The 
psychoanalytic and psychiatric communities have learned caution in relation to 
judging same-sex preferences to be pathological or ‘non-biological’, but it is also 
possible to understand all sexual desires, fantasies and behavior as variations in sexual 
strategy. If homosexuality represents an evolutionary strategy, the same may be true 
of paraphilias including sadomasochism. Although in the view of most evolutionists 
there are probably mental conditions – just as there are illnesses – that represent non-
adaptive variations, or ones that fitted past environments but not current ones, it is 
notoriously hard to judge the long term adaptiveness of something that appears 
abnormal (Nesse, 2004; Nesse and Dawkins, 2010). It may be helpful to take a dual 
perspective on all sexualities, looking to see how they affect the individual and others 
around them, but also seeking to make sense of them (and the variety of reactions to 
them among social groups) in terms of reproductive fitness.  
 
10. Psychological distress may represent loss of reproductive resources. Both 
males and females have evolved to compete with members of their own sex and with 
the opposite sex for reproductive resources. Competition leads inevitably to winners 
and losers. There are losers in direct reproductive terms, as some individuals never 
acquire partners or lose contact with all near kin. More commonly loss occurs in other 
ways. Loss of reproductive resources does not equate automatically with fewer 
children or relatives, although in some cases it may. It can also encompass a failure in 
relationships, or a decline in social role and wealth, reducing the prospects for 
descendants and kin. The practical and emotional consequences of being a loser, or 
seeing oneself as a loser, are immense. Some theorists have argued that depression 
may be response to losing expected reproductive resources, and a signal of a relative 
withdrawal from competition, while anxiety is a marker of anticipated defeat, 
rejection or loss (Gilbert, 1997; Nesse, 2005). In the same way, shame and guilt can 
be seen as evolved regulators of one’s competitive status within or outside the family 
(Hopkins, in press). 
 
We are at root sexually reproducing animals with an evolved unconscious. This is 
true in the consulting room as much as anywhere else. Clinical relationships both echo 
and represent parent-child conflict, and intersexual or intrasexual rivalry. In making 
sense of transference and counter-transference, practitioners may well need to 
consider what pertains to them, not only in relation to their own personal traits, but 
also in terms of their own evolutionary interests. As Kriegman has pointed out (2000, 
p. 77.), this may demand especial insight from a male therapist seeing a female 
patient, especially if he might be tempted to berate her with interpretations arising 
from his own sexualized counter-transference. It may be scarcely less true, however, 
of any configuration of clinician and patient of either sex or any age, where reactions 
are likely to be infused with feelings – anything from strong rivalry, to a wish for a 
relationship, to parental solicitude – determined by the real life biological 
characteristics of the two parties.  
 
When therapy is effective, it is likely to be because of a happy convergence of 
sense-making for the patient, together with a compassionate and restorative 
relationship with the therapist as a human being. It is a common experience that 
helping people to reassign troublesome emotions and behavior to past traumas, or to a 
turbulent family background, can help them to lessen their sense of self-blame. I 
believe that understanding the context of deep time and of our shared evolutionary 
inheritance can add to a sense of one’s humanity, reducing the inclination to judge 
oneself or others harshly. Evolutionary thought can help to make sense of many of the 
narratives brought to the consulting room concerning conflict between genders and 
generations, as well as the internal representations of these relationships, and the 
powerful feelings and distress that can go with them. Evolutionary insights can be 
liberating. Evolutionary theory points to a sense of our unity with all creation, and to 
mutual recognition as the sexual beings we all are. I believe it offers a paradigm that 
can reunite the talking therapies with neuroscience, as Freud originally hoped. 
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